Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

City of Roosevelt v. Daniel Gilchrest : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark Allred; Attorney for Appellee.
Joel D. Berrett, Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Roosevelt v. Gilchrest, No. 960047 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/41

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRi£F
UTAH

DOCUMENT
KFU
50
A10
IN THE UTAH COURT 06>0©KfSL6IO.

Q loODA-^- P A

CITY OF ROOSEVELT,
Plaintiff, Appellee,

Case No.

960047-CA

DANIEL GILCHREST,
Defendant/Appellant.

Category No.

15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

AN APPEAL FROM THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The Honorable John R. Anderson, Presiding

Joel D. Berrett
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant
P.O. Box 262
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(801) 722-3606

Clark Allred
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellee
865 East 200 North (112-10)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(801) 722-3928

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

OCT 2 8 1996
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF ROOSEVELT,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No.

960047-CA

DANIEL GILCHREST,
Defendant/Appellant,

Category No. 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

AN APPEAL FROM THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The Honorable John R. Anderson, Presiding

Joel D. Berrett
Attorney for Defendant
Appellant
P.O. Box 262
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(801) 722-3606

Clark Allred
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellee
865 East 200 North (112-10)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(801) 722-3928

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

ARGUMENT

3

CONCLUSION

7

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Anders v. State of California. 87 S. Ct. 1396
(1967)

3, 7

State v. Belcher, 475 P. 2d 60
(Utah 1970)

4

State v. Clark, 501 P. 2d 274
(Utah 1972)

5

State v. Clayton, 639 P. 2d 168
(Utah 1981)

state Vt Farnsyorth,

519 p

-

3, 7

2d 244

(Utah 1974)
State v. Georgopoulos, 492 P. 2d
(Utah 1972)

5
6

State v. Smith, 706 P. 2d 1052
(Utah 1985)

6

State v. Thurmanr 846 P. 2d 1256
(Utah 1993)

1,2

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (2)(f)
Utah Code Section 77-29-1 et seq

1
2,4, 6

Utah Code Section 77-17-7

2, 6

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF ROOSEVELT,
Case No.

Plaintiff/Appellee,

960047-CA

vs.
Category No.

DANIEL GILCHREST,

15

Defendant/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-2a-3 (2) (f). Defendant/Appellant appeals from a
final Judgment entered in the Eighth Judicial District Court,
Duchesne County on November 30, 1995.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON
APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the plaintiff

could prosecute the defendant despite defendant's filing a Notice
and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges?
A trial court's conclusion of law in criminal cases are
reviewed for correctness.
1993).
2.

State v. Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256 (Utah

Record page 28,48-54.
Did the trial court correctly rule that a criminal

conviction could be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice?
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are
1

reviewed for correctness.
1993).

State v. Thurmanf 846 P. 2d 1256 (Utah

Record Page 25.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Section 77-29-1 et seq.
Utah Code Section 77-17-7
Copies of these statutory provisions are attached to this
Brief as an addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Gilchrest, filed a Notice and Request for
Disposition of Pending Charges, dated March 20, 1995 with the DIO
record unit at the Utah State Prison.

Record page 8.

It was

apparently filed with the District Court on March 27, 1995. Record
page 8.

On April 13, 1995, the plaintiff filed an information

charging the defendant with theft, a Class B Misdemeanor and
Automobile Burglary, a Class A Misdemeanor, against the defendant.
Record page 1.

On July 31, 1995 the defendant made a Motion to

Dismiss based on his filing for a 120 day disposition and trial not
being held within 120 days of March 20, 1996.
defendants Motion.

The Court denied

Record page 28.

On August 9, 1995, the case was tried before the Court.

The

issue was raised whether the defendant could be convicted based on
the testimony of an accomplice which was uncorroborated.

Record

page 29, 39, 40. Each of the parties filed memoranda and the Court
ruled that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice would
support a conviction and found the defendant guilty of Automobile

2

Burglary, a Class A Misdemeanor and Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor.
Record page 25.
STATEMENT QF FACTS
Jacob Quada was the first witness called by the State. Record
Page 63.

He testified that before Thanksgiving, 1994, he and

Gilchrest went to a friend's house and he wasn't there.
page 64-65.

Record

Gilchrest walked down the street, came back and drove

around the corner from a dark car.

Quada and Gilchrest got out of

Mr. Gilchrest's vehicle, went back to the car, took some speakers
out of the car and put them into Gilchrest's truck.
65-67.

Record pages

About a week later, the defendant put the speakers in his

car, took them to Heber and pawned them.

Record page 68.

A second witness called by the state was Paul J. Mitchell.
Record page 81. Mr. Mitchell testified that he lived at 679 North
400 East in Roosevelt. Record page 81. He testified that he owned
a black 1983 Mercury Caprice and that in approximately August of
19 94 he had two fifteen inch Rockford Phosgate speakers stolen.
Transcript pages 81-83.
The defendant did not testify.

Record page 34.

ARGUMENT
This brief is filed pursuant to Anders v. State of California,
87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967) and State v. Clayton, 639 P. 2d 168 (Utah
1981).
The first issue raised by Gilchrest is whether the Court was
correct when it denied defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the
trial being held more than 120 days after defendant filed a

3

detainer•

The defendant's detainer was filed March 27, 1995

(Record p. 8) and the information was filed on April 13, 1995.
(Record P. 1). The trial was held on August 9, 1995.
56,

Record p.

In Utah Code Section 77-29-1 (1) it states:
Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of
imprisonment in the state prison, jail or
other penal or correctional institution of
this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment
or information, and the prisoner shall deliver
to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the
same, a written demand specifying the nature
of the charge and the Court wherein it is
pending and requesting disposition of the
pending charge, he shall be entitled to have
the charge brought to trial within 120 days of
the date of delivery of written notice.

When the defendant appeared in Court on July 31, 1995 to be
arraigned, more than 120 days had passed from the date the 120 day
detainer had been filed.
The pertinent language of the statute as it is applied to this
case is "and there is pending against the prisoner in this state
any untried indictment or information."

The Courts in this state

have determined that a request that is made before an information
is filed is premature and a nullity.
In State v. Belcher, 475 P. 2d 60 (Utah 1970) the defendant
filed a detainer on September 19, 1969. A preliminary hearing was
held on November 20, 1969 and an information was filed on November
26, 1969.

The Court held that there was no way to dispose of the

matter finally until the information was filed and that the request
was

premature.

The defendant

appealed

asking

that he be

exonerated because he had not been tried within 90 days from the

date of his request.

The Court denied his request.

In State v. Clark, 501 P. 2d 274 (Utah 1972) the Complaint was
signed against the defendant on November 11, 1971. The defendant
filed a detainer on November 15, 1971. A preliminary hearing was
held on February 1, 1972 and nine (9) days later an information was
filed.

On February 24, 1972, the defendant moved for dismissal on

the ground that more than 90 days had elapsed since he demanded
trial.

The Court granted the Motion.

The State appealed and the

Order of the trial judge was reversed.

The Court held that the

statute specifically limits the request to a situation where there
is a pending untried information, indictment or complaint...This
written demand was a nullity...we think the State has 90 days from
notice after an information or indictment has been filed in which
to bring the defendant to trial in a felony case.
In State v. Farnsworth, 519 P. 2d 244 (Utah 1974) it is
stated:
His argument seems to be that after he files a
demand, the statute requires that any
accusation against him whatsoever, whether he
had been charged with the crime or not, must
be disposed of within the ninety days. What
the statute says is that whenever during the
term of imprisonment there is pending any
untried indictment, information or complaint
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
trial within ninety days after request for
disposition. This statute plainly does not
apply to any unfiled charge. If it did so, it
would simply have the effect of giving the
prisoner a ninety day statute of limitations
upon any crime discovered or undiscovered,
that he may have committed.
The statute
indicates no such intent and his contention is
without merit.
Counsel for Gilchrest has conducted research on Utah Code

Section 77-29-1 and the cases decided thereunder and has found no
support for the position advanced by Gilchrest.

Counsel believes

the first issue presented by Gilchrest is meritless*
The second issue raised by Gilchrest is that he cannot be
convicted based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
Utah Code Section 77-17-7 (1) states:
A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice.
In order for one to be an accomplice it must be shown that he
knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent with the principal
offender,

united in the commission of a crime so that he could

also be charged with the same offense.
P. 2d (Utah 1972).

State v. Georgopoulos, 492

Quada was an accomplice in this case.

Mr.

Quada admitted that he helped take the speakers out of the car,
took them down to Gilchrestfs truck and put them in the back of his
pickup.

Record p. 67.

In State v. Smith, 706 P. 2d 1052 (Utah

1985) the Court held that the defendants conviction could be had
solely on the testimony of accomplices under Section 77-17-7 if the
jury determined the testimony to be credible.

The Court indicated

in a footnote that numerous states have held that a conviction can
be held on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
Gilchrest was tried to the Court which found him guilty based on
the testimony of Quada.

Counsel was unable to find any law which

would invalidate Section 77-17-7.

Therefore, counsel believes the

second argument of Gilchrest is meritless.
A copy of this brief will be mailed to Gilchrest as indicated
in the mailing certificate attached hereto.
6

CONCLUSION
Counsel files this brief under Andersf supra and Clayton r
supra because after an examination of the case, he believes the
appeal of Gilchrest lacks merit.
DATED this Z *? day of October, 1996.

JO&L D7 BERRETT
A&corney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on the
personally mailed

day of October, 1996, I

a true and correct copy of the foregoing

to Clark Allred, Attorney for Plaintiff at 865 East
200

North

(112-10),

Roosevelt,

Utah

and

Daniel

Gilchrest,

Defendant, at c/o Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah
84020, by depositing the same, postage prepaid, in the United
States Mail in Roosevelt, Utah.

Jone Wells
Secretary
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ADDENDUM A
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77-29-1
Section
77-29-5.

77-29-6.
77-29-7.
77-29-8.

77-29-1.

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Section
77-29-9

Interstate agreement on detainers
— Enactment into law — Text of
agreement.
Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined.
Interstate agreement - Duty of
state agencies and political subdivisions to cooperate.
Interstate agreement — Application of habitual criminal law.

77-29-10.
77.29-H

Interstate agreement — Kucaprcl
prisoner while in tempouo
custody.
Interstate agreement — Dutj d
warden.
Interstate agreement - Mian*?
general as administrator **d
information agent

Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.

(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there U
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informs
Lion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the chnrg*
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, HherifTor
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit*
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion (w
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 77-29-1, e n a c t e d by L.
1980, c h . 15, § 2.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Right to speedy tfikl,
Utah Const., Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Burden of compliance.
Commencement of period.
Delay caused by codefendant's action.
Delay caused by prisoner.

Dismissal with prejudice.
Forfeiture.
G o o d c a u s e for
continuance.
Good cause for failure
Premature request

756

77-17-6

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCKDUKK
NOTKS TO DECISIONS

Proof of c o r p o r a t e e x i s t e n c e .
In prosecution for forger}', testimony that
certain corporation was organized under laws
of Maine was incompetent to prove existence of
corporation, since this did not amount to proof
by reputation. State v. Brown, 33 Utah 109, 93
P. 52(1907).
Corporate existence of railroad company
could be shown by proof that general reputation

of railroad company was that it was a corpor*.
tion and transacted business as such. Sut<* v
Reese, 44 Utah 256, 140 V. 126 (1914).
In arson prosecution proof of corporate *u§<
tence of insurance company by policy of irmur*
ance was insufficient, since policy was not ancient document (and thus self-proving), *n4
proof was required to be made. StnU? %;
Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <s=» 567.

77-17-6.

Lottery tickets — Evidence.

(1) On a trial for violation of any of the lottery provisions of the Utah
Criminal Code, it is not necessary to prove:
(a) The existence of any lottery in which any lottery tickets shall
purport to have been issued;
(h) The actual signing of any ticket or share, or pretended share of any
pretended lottery; or
(c) That any lottery ticket, share or interest was signed or issued by the
authority of any manager, or of any person assuming to have authority m
manager.
(2) In all cases, proof of the sale, furnishing, bartering or procuring of any
lottery ticket, share or interest therein, or of any instrument purporting to be
a ticket, or part or share of any ticket shall be evidence that the share or
interest was signed and issued according to its purport.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-6, e n a c t e d by L.
1980, c h . 15, § 2.

Cross-References. -— lottery as "gambling*
within Criminal Code, § 76-10-1101.

COLIJVTERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Lotteries § 22 ot seq.
Key N u m b e r s . — Lotteries «=» 29.

77-17-7.

Conviction on testimony of accomplice — In*
struction to jury.

(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accom*
plice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given to
the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution,
and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of
the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 77-17-7, e n a c t e d by L.
1980, c h . 15, § 2.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for con-

duct of another, § 76-2-202.
Discharging one of several defendant* U>U#*
tify for state, § 77-17-2.
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FILED
Utah Court of Apnea/s

JOEL D. BERRETT (0307)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
P.O. Box 26 2
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(801) 722-3606

OCT 2 9 1996
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF ROOSEVELT,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW

vs.
DANIEL GILCHREST,
Defendant/Appellant,

Case No.

960047-CA

COMES NOW the undersigned, and pursuant to Rule 3SA, Utah
Rules of Appellant Procedure, moves the above entitled Court for an
Order allowing him to withdraw as counsel for the appellant in this
case, Daniel Gilchrest.
This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that
after an examination of this case, counsel believes the appeal of
Gilchrest lacks merit and therefore requests permission to withdraw
pursuant to State v. Clayton, 639 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1981).
DATED this J^JS

da

Y

of

October, 1996.

t A&-

£*4SA

JOWL D. BERRETT
^trorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the _^2X ^aY

°^ October, 1995, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW,
to Clark Allred, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 865 East 200 North
(112-10), Roosevelt, Utah 84066 and Daniel Gilchrest, c/o Utah
State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah

84020, by depositing the

same, postage prepaid, in the United States Post Office, Roosevelt,
Utah.

Jonej Wells
Secretary

